The Red Sea Arc, Somalia, and South Sudan
Date: February 19, 2026
Executive Summary
“Africa is not a sideshow to global competition — it is the hinge. While Washington argues with itself, others are building ports, shaping debt, rewriting maritime rules, and quietly deciding who will control the world’s next generation of trade corridors.”
The United Arab Emirates (UAE) and the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (Saudi Arabia) are expanding influence across Africa through ports, finance, security cooperation, and political brokerage.
They share core interests - maritime security in the Red Sea and Bab el-Mandeb, countering rival influence, and securing food and energy supply chains - but increasingly compete over who sets rules, owns logistics, and shapes outcomes.
The competition is most consequential in weak states where external capital and security support can tilt internal balances, including Somalia and South Sudan.
The dominant risk is not open conflict between the UAE and Saudi Arabia. The risk is second order: their parallel campaigns create incentives for local actors to fragment authority, monetize sovereignty, and treat national institutions as bargaining chips. That dynamic increases corruption, weakens state capacity, and creates exploitable gaps for Turkey, Qatar, China, and Russia.
Strategic Stakes
“If America loses situational awareness in the Red Sea and Bab el-Mandeb, it will not be because we were defeated militarily — it will be because we were distracted politically while others institutionalized control over the arteries of global commerce.”
1. Maritime chokepoints: The Bab el-Mandeb and Red Sea corridor are high value for global trade and Gulf energy flows. Saudi Arabia has sought to formalize Red Sea coordination through the Council of Arab and African States Bordering the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden, launched in 2020. Saudi Press Agency background: https://www.spa.gov.sa/2019804 and a 2025 maritime security analysis noting the Council: https://mecouncil.org/publication/navigating-rocky-waters-gcc-strategies-for-maritime-security/
2. Ports and logistics: The UAE prefers hard infrastructure and concession networks. A signature example is DP World’s 30-year concession at Berbera in Somaliland, announced in 2016, with major capital investment. DP World press PDF: https://theloadstar.com/wp-content/uploads/2016_09_05_Somaliland_Concession_EN.pdf and reporting: https://www.lloydslist.com/LL109884/DP-World-wins-30-year-concession-for-port-of-Berbera-in-Somaliland
“Ports are not infrastructure; they are leverage. Whoever owns the docks, the cranes, and the contracts owns the conversation when crises begin.”
3. Political leverage in fragile states: Somalia and South Sudan offer influence nodes with outsized strategic return. Somalia sits on the Red Sea approaches. South Sudan is a fragile oil state in the Nile basin where financing deals can translate into long term leverage. An Africa Center analysis describes a proposed UAE linked oil-backed financing arrangement negotiated in 2024. Africa Center: https://africacenter.org/spotlight/gulf-state-actors-east-africa/
“In weak states, capital is strategy. Financing agreements that appear transactional today become sovereign constraints tomorrow.”
Core Assessment - What the UAE is doing
“The Emirati model is pragmatic and networked — ports first, influence second, politics last - but the result is durable access that outlives headlines and administrations.”
UAE strategy in Africa is networked and transactional. It uses logistics firms, sovereign wealth capital, and security relationships to build durable access, not just influence.
Build and operate ports and corridors that function as influence anchors. DP World’s Berbera concession is the clearest example. https://theloadstar.com/wp-content/uploads/2016_09_05_Somaliland_Concession_EN.pdf
Establish or support forward basing and access agreements when operationally useful. Analysts documented UAE reliance on Assab, Eritrea beginning around 2015 for Yemen operations, with later reporting of drawdown. Just Security (2017): https://www.justsecurity.org/41450/uaes-military-naval-reliance-eritrea-war-yemen-riskier-u-s/ and AP reporting on base dismantling (2021): https://apnews.com/article/eritrea-dubai-only-on-ap-united-arab-emirates-east-africa-088f41c7d54d6a397398b2a825f5e45a
Engage multiple Somali power centers, not only Mogadishu. This creates redundancy but drives sovereignty friction with the federal government, which has repeatedly criticized Emirati engagement with regional administrations. A 2018 analysis describes spillover of Gulf rivalries into Somali internal politics. International Crisis Group: https://www.crisisgroup.org/rpt/africa/somalia/260-somalia-and-gulf-crisis
Take higher risk exposure in unstable environments when leverage payoff is high. In South Sudan, reporting describes a large oil-linked financing proposal tied to a Dubai based entity and discounted crude repayment. Africa Center: https://africacenter.org/spotlight/gulf-state-actors-east-africa/ and sector reporting: https://www.africa-energy.com/news-centre/article/doubts-aplenty-south-sudan-strikes-12bn-loan-deal-dubai-based
Core Assessment - What Saudi Arabia is doing
“Saudi Arabia is not competing crane for crane; it is competing framework for framework — defining the rules of the basin before others define them first.”
Saudi Arabia’s approach is more state-centric and architecture-driven. It seeks to define the rules of the basin and align governments into a Saudi led security and economic perimeter.
Build multilateral Red Sea frameworks and treat the waterway as an extension of homeland security. The 2020 Red Sea Council is the clearest institutional move. SPA: https://www.spa.gov.sa/2019804
Use large scale development finance, investment diplomacy, and religious soft power to anchor relationships with recognized governments. Horn of Africa investment mapping shows Saudi investment historically concentrated in Ethiopia and Sudan (especially agriculture), with smaller exposure elsewhere. Clingendael: https://www.clingendael.org/pub/2018/riyal-politik/4-mapping-the-extent-of-gulf-investments-and-oda-in-the-horn-of-africa/
Position as mediator and convenor in regional conflicts. Saudi Arabia, alongside the United States, has hosted Sudan ceasefire and humanitarian talks in Jeddah, demonstrating Riyadh’s preferred role as diplomatic broker. AP background on resumed Jeddah talks: https://apnews.com/article/f3516c941335f0e21c01b15e30572ae1 and Al Jazeera explainer: https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2023/10/31/why-are-sudans-warring-factions-meeting-in-jeddah
Somalia - Why it is becoming more complex now
“Somalia is not unstable because it lacks partners; it is unstable because it has too many. When external patrons multiply, sovereignty fragments, and fragmentation invites exploitation.”
Somalia is a multi-layered sovereignty environment. External actors can choose to work with Mogadishu, with federal member states, or with de facto authorities. That choice is itself political.
The UAE’s port and security ties with Somaliland and Puntland increase its leverage but also increase friction with Mogadishu, which frames such relationships as sovereignty violations. Crisis Group’s 2018 report details how the Qatar crisis spilled into Somalia and how neutrality decisions triggered Gulf pressure. https://www.crisisgroup.org/rpt/africa/somalia/260-somalia-and-gulf-crisis
Turkey has expanded a parallel security footprint. Turkey opened its largest overseas military base in Mogadishu in 2017 to train Somali forces, anchoring long term influence. Reuters (2017): https://www.reuters.com/article/world/turkey-opens-military-base-in-mogadishu-to-train-somali-soldiers-idUSKCN1C50J9/
Turkey deepened ties again in 2024 through maritime security support and an energy cooperation agreement with Somalia, reinforcing Ankara’s role as a security and economic patron. Reuters (Feb 22, 2024): https://www.reuters.com/world/turkey-provide-maritime-security-support-somalia-official-2024-02-22/ and Reuters (Mar 7, 2024): https://www.reuters.com/business/energy/turkey-signs-energy-cooperation-deal-with-somalia-2024-03-07/
Qatar remains an active influence player in Somali politics and has been linked in reporting to rivalry dynamics against UAE aligned local actors. Somalia and Qatar denied a 2019 New York Times related allegation about a Bosaso attack, illustrating how Gulf contestation can intersect with violence narratives. Al Jazeera (Jul 23, 2019): https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2019/7/23/qatar-and-somalia-deny-nyts-bombing-news-report and a related analytical treatment of Gulf crisis spillover: https://www.crisisgroup.org/rpt/africa/somalia/260-somalia-and-gulf-crisis
In January 2026, Reuters reported DP World said Berbera operations were unaffected by a Somalia-UAE dispute after Somalia said it was annulling agreements with the UAE. Reuters (Jan 13, 2026): https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/dubais-dp-world-says-operations-somalilands-berbera-port-unaffected-by-uae-2026-01-13/
Assessment: Somalia is now a contested patronage environment. The UAE builds logistics leverage through sub-national channels. Saudi Arabia competes by strengthening federal government alignment and Red Sea institutional architecture. Turkey and Qatar operate as spoilers or alternative patrons. The result is fragmented authority and an increased probability of miscalculation, coercion, and coercive bargaining around ports, security forces, and certification of legitimacy.
South Sudan - Why it is becoming more complex now
“Oil-backed financing in fragile states is rarely just economics. It is a long-term claim on sovereignty disguised as short-term liquidity.”
South Sudan is a classic high leverage weak state: oil, insecurity, elite competition, and chronic fiscal crisis. External financing can function as a strategic mortgage.
UAE linked financing proposals in 2024-2025, described as oil-backed and long duration, create potential long term leverage over South Sudan’s crude flows and budget oxygen. Africa Center: https://africacenter.org/spotlight/gulf-state-actors-east-africa/ and Africa Energy: https://www.africa-energy.com/news-centre/article/doubts-aplenty-south-sudan-strikes-12bn-loan-deal-dubai-based
Saudi Arabia has historically invested more heavily in Ethiopia and Sudan than South Sudan, but Saudi food security logic and Red Sea architecture makes South Sudan a plausible future target as agriculture and upstream Nile basin politics intensify. Clingendael mapping: https://www.clingendael.org/pub/2018/riyal-politik/4-mapping-the-extent-of-gulf-investments-and-oda-in-the-horn-of-africa/
Assessment: The main risk is elite capture through debt and discounted oil structures. These deals can stabilize the regime short term while weakening state sovereignty long term. That creates a permissive environment for corruption, private security arrangements, and third party entry by Russia and China.
External Actor Overlay - Who else is in the fight
“When Gulf competition intersects with Turkish basing, Chinese infrastructure finance, and Russian security services, Africa becomes a chessboard with more players than squares.”
Turkey
Security patron in Somalia via TURKSOM base and training mission since 2017. Reuters (2017): https://www.reuters.com/article/world/turkey-opens-military-base-in-mogadishu-to-train-somali-soldiers-idUSKCN1C50J9/
Expanded maritime security support and energy cooperation in 2024, increasing leverage over Somali coastal security and resource narratives. Reuters (Feb 22, 2024): https://www.reuters.com/world/turkey-provide-maritime-security-support-somalia-official-2024-02-22/
China
Opened its first overseas military base in Djibouti in 2017, creating enduring power projection capacity in the Horn and an infrastructure-security stack that influences port politics. Reuters (Aug 1, 2017): https://www.reuters.com/article/world/china-formally-opens-first-overseas-military-base-in-djibouti-idUSKBN1AH3E1/
China’s dual use port and financing model shapes African state choices, including in debt negotiations and infrastructure procurement.
Russia
Wagner and successor structures have been active across Africa, including Sudan, and are used for influence, security services, and access to concessions. CFR overview: https://www.cfr.org/articles/what-russias-wagner-group-doing-africa and Brookings analysis: https://www.brookings.edu/articles/russias-wagner-group-in-africa-influence-commercial-concessions-rights-violations-and-counterinsurgency-failure/
After Prigozhin, reporting indicates restructuring toward a more formalized Russian Africa Corps SVR/GRU model. Le Monde reporting on Africa Corps consolidation dynamics: https://www.lemonde.fr/en/international/article/2025/01/24/russia-delivers-armored-vehicles-to-mali-and-restructures-military-presence_6737390_4.html
Qatar
Active political patronage in Somalia and alignment with Turkey in countering UAE and Saudi influence during the Gulf crisis period. Crisis Group’s 2018 report provides the baseline on Gulf crisis spillover into Somalia. https://www.crisisgroup.org/rpt/africa/somalia/260-somalia-and-gulf-crisis
Formal Risk Assessment with Probability Scoring (12 month to 36 month horizon)
“The greatest risk to U.S. interests is not sudden collapse; it is incremental erosion — authority divided, revenue mortgaged, ports politicized, and influence normalized by those who showed up while we debated.”
Scoring method
Likelihood: 1 (rare) to 5 (highly likely)
Impact: 1 (limited) to 5 (severe)
Risk score: Likelihood x Impact
Time horizons: near (0-12 months), mid (12-36 months)
Risk 1 - Sovereignty fracture in Somalia driven by competing patronage
Mechanism: external port and security ties routed through sub-national entities, plus alternative patronage from Turkey and Qatar, drives federal member state bargaining and de-legitimizes Mogadishu.
Likelihood: near 4, mid 4
Impact: near 4, mid 5
Risk score: near 16, mid 20
Risk 2 - Port corridor escalation in Somaliland and Puntland
Mechanism: disputes over concessions, customs revenue, and recognition politics trigger coercive moves by local actors and external patrons.
Likelihood: near 3, mid 3
Impact: near 4, mid 4
Risk score: near 12, mid 12
Risk 3 - South Sudan debt-for-oil leverage creates long term sovereignty loss and elite capture
Mechanism: large oil-backed financing with discounted repayment embeds external leverage over crude, budgets, and patronage flows.
Likelihood: near 3, mid 4
Impact: near 4, mid 5
Risk score: near 12, mid 20
Risk 4 - Great power overlay converts Gulf competition into a multi-actor crisis
Mechanism: China’s Djibouti base and infrastructure stack, Russia’s security services footprint, and Turkey’s Somali military role create multi-actor entanglement.
Likelihood: near 3, mid 4
Impact: near 4, mid 5
Risk score: near 12, mid 20
Risk 5 - Red Sea maritime insecurity shocks Gulf positioning and raises the value of African footholds
Mechanism: shipping disruption elevates the value of ports, basing, and coastal security influence; Gulf states compete harder.
Likelihood: near 4, mid 4
Impact: near 4, mid 5
Risk score: near 16, mid 20
Mitigating factors
“Africa still has agency. But agency without institutional strength becomes bargaining power for whoever is most prepared to pay.”
Gulf states still share overriding interests in Red Sea stability and countering rival penetration, which can cap escalation.
Somalia’s internal politics can resist full capture by any single patron because fragmentation creates veto points.
International financial scrutiny can constrain extreme debt terms in South Sudan, though not reliably.
Early Warning Indicators (Somalia and South Sudan)
“The first signs of strategic loss are rarely dramatic — a contract annulled, a base agreement revised, a debt term extended — but together they mark a quiet transfer of influence.”
Somalia
Formal moves by Mogadishu to annul or criminalize specific foreign agreements, followed by enforcement actions, as reported in early 2026 around UAE ties. Reuters (Jan 13, 2026): https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/dubais-dp-world-says-operations-somalilands-berbera-port-unaffected-by-uae-2026-01-13/
Rapid changes in regional security force funding or training sponsorship.
Increased threats or attacks around port infrastructure and court facilities in Puntland.
Escalation in Somalia-Turkey maritime security implementation activities.
South Sudan
Ratification, securitization, or implementation of large oil-backed finance structures.
Sudden shifts in crude off-take terms or export routing.
Increased private security contracting around oil infrastructure.
Timeline of Notable UAE and Saudi Moves in Africa (2015-2026)
“History will record that the moves were visible. The question is whether Washington was looking.”
2015
- Reporting and analysis describes UAE construction and use of an air and naval base at Assab, Eritrea under a 2015 agreement to support Yemen operations. Just Security (2017): https://www.justsecurity.org/41450/uaes-military-naval-reliance-eritrea-war-yemen-riskier-u-s/
2016
DP World secured a 30-year concession to manage and invest in Berbera port in Somaliland, with announced investment up to $442 million. DP World PDF: https://theloadstar.com/wp-content/uploads/2016_09_05_Somaliland_Concession_EN.pdf
2017
Turkey opened its largest overseas military base in Mogadishu to train Somali forces, anchoring Ankara’s long term role in Somalia. Reuters (2017): https://www.reuters.com/article/world/turkey-opens-military-base-in-mogadishu-to-train-somali-soldiers-idUSKCN1C50J9/
China formally opened its first overseas military base in Djibouti. Reuters (Aug 1, 2017): https://www.reuters.com/article/world/china-formally-opens-first-overseas-military-base-in-djibouti-idUSKBN1AH3E1/
2018
International Crisis Group assessed how the Gulf crisis spilled into Somalia and heightened tensions between Somalia’s federal government and the UAE, while Qatar was also a key factor in Somali alignments. Crisis Group (Jun 5, 2018): https://www.crisisgroup.org/rpt/africa/somalia/260-somalia-and-gulf-crisis
2019
Reporting around Qatar and Somalia highlighted disputed allegations related to violence in Bosaso amid Gulf rivalry narratives. Al Jazeera (Jul 23, 2019): https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2019/7/23/qatar-and-somalia-deny-nyts-bombing-news-report
2020
Saudi Arabia launched the Council of Arab and African States Bordering the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden, institutionalizing a Saudi led Red Sea cooperation concept. SPA: https://www.spa.gov.sa/2019804
2021
AP reported the UAE dismantling parts of its base in Assab, Eritrea after pullback from Yemen operations, based on satellite imagery. AP (Feb 17, 2021): https://apnews.com/article/eritrea-dubai-only-on-ap-united-arab-emirates-east-africa-088f41c7d54d6a397398b2a825f5e45a
2023
Saudi Arabia and the United States hosted ceasefire and humanitarian discussions for Sudan’s conflict in Jeddah, reinforcing Saudi convening power. AP (Nov 2023): https://apnews.com/article/f3516c941335f0e21c01b15e30572ae1
2024
Turkey committed to maritime security support for Somalia and signed an energy cooperation agreement, deepening its security-economic stack in the Horn. Reuters (Feb 22, 2024): https://www.reuters.com/world/turkey-provide-maritime-security-support-somalia-official-2024-02-22/ and Reuters (Mar 7, 2024): https://www.reuters.com/business/energy/turkey-signs-energy-cooperation-deal-with-somalia-2024-03-07/
Reporting described a major UAE linked oil-backed financing proposal with South Sudan negotiated in 2024. Africa Center: https://africacenter.org/spotlight/gulf-state-actors-east-africa/
2025
Reuters reported a U.S., Saudi Arabia, UAE, and Egypt proposed roadmap for Sudan peace (the Quad), illustrating coordinated but also competitive Gulf roles in conflict brokerage. Reuters (Sep 12, 2025): https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/us-saudi-arabia-uae-egypt-propose-roadmap-sudan-peace-2025-09-12/
2026
Reuters reported DP World said Berbera operations were unaffected amid Somalia-UAE tensions after Somalia said it was annulling agreements. Reuters (Jan 13, 2026): https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/dubais-dp-world-says-operations-somalilands-berbera-port-unaffected-by-uae-2026-01-13/
Reuters reported the UAE pledged $500 million for Sudan aid while accusations persisted regarding RSF support, which the UAE denied, highlighting the dual track of humanitarian diplomacy and contested influence narratives. Reuters (Feb 3, 2026): https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/uae-pledges-500-million-for-sudan-aid-washington-gathers-donors-2026-02-03/
Policy Bottom Line
“Africa is not America’s back door. It is the front corridor of twenty-first-century trade, food security, maritime stability, and great-power alignment. If we remain consumed by domestic distraction, we will wake up to discover that the architecture of influence has already been built — without us.”
The Horn of Africa and Nile basin are no longer peripheral theaters. They are the connective tissue between Gulf security, global shipping, and great power competition.
The UAE and Saudi Arabia will continue to compete through different operating styles: the UAE through ports, corridors, and multi-track local relationships; Saudi Arabia through state legitimacy, multilateral architecture, and convening power.
Somalia and South Sudan will continue to monetize that competition. The external overlay - Turkey, Qatar, China, and Russia - will keep the environment unstable and opportunistic.
The highest priority risk is a fragmentation cascade in Somalia that becomes self sustaining and invites coercive bargaining over port revenue, security forces, and recognition politics.