The real question is no longer whether Iran can disrupt the Strait of Hormuz, but whether the United States can reopen it without triggering a wider regional war.
For more than four decades, this scenario has not been hypothetical. It has been studied, rehearsed, war-gamed, and partially executed in a covert SOF operation I participated in - in the late 1980’s (Operation PRIME CHANCE).
The closure of Hormuz was always treated as a dangerous contingency.
It is now a present condition.
As of mid-March 2026, the Strait is functionally closed. Commercial shipping has largely halted. Insurance markets have withdrawn coverage. Tankers are anchoring outside the chokepoint. Maritime traffic has dropped precipitously, in some cases approaching zero.
Iran has declared the waterway closed and warned that vessels attempting to transit risk attack. The result is not a theoretical disruption. It is a live strategic chokehold on roughly one-fifth of global energy flow.
The Long Memory of a Narrow Strait
The institutional memory begins in 1979.
The Iranian Revolution removed a key U.S. partner. Months later, the Soviet Union entered Afghanistan. In Washington, these events fused into a single conclusion: the Persian Gulf had become a contested strategic space, and oil transit through the Strait of Hormuz was now a vulnerability.
The U.S. response was structural. The Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force evolved into U.S. Central Command. With it came a series of contingency plans, refined over decades, that treated Hormuz as a predictable flashpoint.
Our early planning cycles were modular, not singular. They were updated continuously, but their core assumption did not change: if pressured, Iran would seek to disrupt maritime flow rather than confront U.S. forces head-on.
That assumption has now been executed.
The 1980s Rehearsal
The Iran-Iraq War produced what planners still treat as the doctrinal baseline. During the Tanker War, Iran targeted commercial shipping using mines, small boats, and missiles.
The U.S. response, Operation Earnest Will, reflagged and escorted tankers through the Gulf. It was followed by Operation Praying Mantis, a direct strike on Iranian naval assets after a mining incident.
Senior naval officers still refer to this period as the blueprint. It demonstrated three enduring realities:
Iran could disrupt shipping without controlling the sea.
Mines were disproportionately effective relative to cost.
Reopening maritime flow required sustained, multi-domain operations.
Those lessons were not archived. They are now being tested again under more complex conditions.
The Iranian Method: Denial Without Control - Now in Execution
Iran’s approach has remained consistent, even as its tools have evolved. Rather than attempting to dominate the Strait, Iran seeks to make it unusable. That doctrine is no longer theoretical.
It is operational.
Since late February, multiple merchant vessels have been struck by projectiles, drones, or explosive boats, with at least 16 to 21 ships attacked across the Gulf and Strait approaches. Within short time windows, clusters of ships have been hit, reinforcing uncertainty and deterrence through fear rather than physical blockade.
Even vessels outside the immediate chokepoint, such as those near Fujairah, have been struck, expanding the battlespace beyond the Strait itself. Shipowners are refusing transit. Crews are unwilling to sail. Insurers are withdrawing coverage. The Strait is not sealed by geography.
It is closed by risk.
The U.S. Kill Chain: Reopening the Strait Under Real Conditions
U.S. planning for Hormuz has matured into a layered operational response built over decades. That framework remains intact. What has changed is the starting point. The United States is no longer preparing for disruption.
It is confronting an active denial environment:
Phase One: Attribution and Stabilization. Confirm the nature and scope of attacks. Establish maritime domain awareness across a now-expanded battlespace.
Phase Two: Mine Countermeasures. This remains the most time-intensive element. If mines have been deployed at scale, clearance operations could take weeks or longer.
Phase Three: Suppression of Iranian Capabilities. U.S. and allied forces have already begun striking Iranian naval and military assets, including mine-laying vessels and coastal infrastructure. This phase carries escalation risk. It is no longer a contingency threshold. It is underway.
Phase Four: Sustained Protection of Shipping. Convoy operations are under discussion, but implementation has lagged. Even where naval escorts are proposed, maritime authorities warn they cannot guarantee safe passage under current threat conditions. Escorting ships is not equivalent to restoring confidence.
The Deeper Issue: Time and Friction Under Active Closure
The underlying problem is not capability. It is time. Iran has achieved disruption in days. Reopening the Strait may take weeks or longer.
Even partial disruption has already produced systemic effects. Oil prices have surged above $100 per barrel. Shipping traffic has collapsed. Export hubs such as Fujairah have been disrupted or halted.
More than 1,000 vessels have been delayed or blocked from transit. This creates a strategic asymmetry that planning frameworks acknowledged but did not have to operationalize at scale until now.
Alliance Strain and Strategic Ambiguity
As of now, key U.S. allies have declined to commit naval forces to reopening the Strait. Some states are negotiating limited passage arrangements with Iran. Others are adopting a wait-and-see posture.
This introduces friction into U.S. planning assumptions that historically relied on coalition burden-sharing. It also reinforces Iran’s strategy: fragment the response, raise the cost, and extend timelines.
Where the Doctrine Meets Reality
Recent events suggest the long-standing contingency framework is being executed under less favorable conditions than originally assumed. Iran’s integration of drones, missiles, mines, and maritime harassment has expanded the battlespace beyond the Strait itself.
The environment is no longer linear. It is layered and distributed. At the same time, U.S. response options are constrained by escalation risk across the region, limited allied participation, and the need to protect global energy flows while avoiding full-scale war. This is precisely the scenario as planners we anticipated - and the one most hoped to avoid.
The Strategic Trajectory
If current patterns hold, several outcomes become more likely. If Iran sustains pressure, the economic effects will deepen rapidly. If U.S. strikes expand, the conflict could move beyond maritime targets to broader regional escalation. If coalition participation remains limited, the burden of reopening the Strait will fall primarily on U.S. forces, extending both operational timelines and exposure.
None of these pathways are speculative. They are embedded in decades of contingency planning.
What is new is that they are now unfolding simultaneously.
A Long War That Never Began - Now Entering Its Decisive Phase
This conflict did not begin in 2026. It has been simmering since the early 1980s, managed through deterrence, proxy engagement, and controlled escalation. Iran learned how to impose cost without triggering overwhelming retaliation. The United States learned how to restore order without committing to prolonged occupation. That equilibrium is now under strain.
The Strait of Hormuz has moved from a theoretical flashpoint to an active battlespace.
The Risk Now
The risk now is not that planners lack options. It is that the margin for controlled escalation is collapsing.
If the Strait remains closed, pressure will build for decisive action. That action, once taken, may not remain confined to maritime security. The United States retains the capability to reopen the Strait. But doing so will require sustained operations against a prepared adversary operating on interior lines.
If escalation continues, the conflict may shift from a campaign to reopen a waterway into a broader regional confrontation. The deeper issue is no longer whether the system works. It is whether it can work fast enough, and whether the cost of restoring flow exceeds the cost of the disruption itself.